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Abstract 
This experimental study examines the relationship between rumination and attentional 
bias.  Additionally, the study aims to determine, within a diathesis-stress framework, 
whether rumination or attentional bias (or both) can prospectively predict 
psychological distress.  Eighty-one participants completed selected measures of 
rumination and psychological distress at time one, in addition to experimental 
manipulations of rumination and mood and measures of mood and attentional bias at 
time two.  Seventy-three participants (90% follow-up) completed final measures of 
stress and psychological distress approximately three weeks later.  In combination 
with negative mood, inducing rumination decreased positive attentional bias, whilst 
inducing distraction increased positive attentional bias.   Rumination and stress 
interacted to predict change in psychological distress.  Negative attentional bias 
showed a trend towards interacting with rumination and stress to predict dysphoria.  
The findings supported the proposed diathesis-stress models.  In addition, a causal 
relationship between rumination and positive attentional bias has been empirically 
established for the first time.   
 
KEYWORDS:  Psychological distress; rumination; attentional bias; stress; diathesis-
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Cognitive theory (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979) posits that certain cognitive 
vulnerabilities, when ‘activated’ by stressful or negative life events, result in 
psychological distress and diathesis-stress models are often used to illustrate these 
relationships.  There are numerous cognitive vulnerabilities reported in the literature, 
however, the present research focuses on two specific vulnerabilities, rumination and 
attentional bias, as both of these have been linked to distress and to each other 
theoretically (e.g. Bradley et al, 1997; Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Beevers & Carver, 
2003).  Psychological distress can be defined in a number of ways.  However, in the 
current research it is operationalised as dysphoria, hopelessness and suicidal thinking 
for the following reasons.   High levels of suicidal thinking are currently reported 
within the UK general population, with one in 38 females and one in 50 males 
reporting suicidal thoughts each year (Gunnell, Harbord, Singleton, Jenkins & Lewis, 
2004).  Within the sixteen to 24 years age group the incidence is even higher (Gunnell 
et al., 2004) illustrating the importance of examining potentially related cognitive 
constructs within a young adult population.  As dysphoria and hopelessness are 
proximal predictors of suicidal thinking (O’Connor & Sheehy, 2000; O’Connor & 
O’Connor, 2003), examining cognitive constructs associated with these measures of 
distress may also yield important results.   
 
Attentional Bias and Distress 
Attentional bias can be thought of as a change in the orientation of an individual’s 
attention resulting in the awareness of a specific feature of their environment 
(Williams, Watts, MacLeod & Mathews, 1988).  This change may be conscious, but is 
more commonly unconscious (Williams et al., 1988).  Attentional bias can be 
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measured in a number of ways, including the dot-probe (MacLeod, Mathews & Tata, 
1986) and the emotional Stroop tasks (Stroop, 1935). 
Attentional bias has been shown to be related to a number of types of 
distress.  For example, attentional bias towards negative stimuli has been found in 
depressed individuals in some studies (e.g. Beevers & Carver, 2003), but not in others 
(e.g. MacLeod et al., 1986).  Bradley, Mogg and Lee (1997) surmise that attentional 
biases toward negative information are more commonly associated with depression in 
studies where stimuli are presented for longer durations (500-1000 ms).  There is also 
some evidence to suggest that depressed individuals lack the positive attentional 
biases displayed by matched controls (Gotlib, McLachlan & Katz, 1988; McCabe & 
Gotlib, 1995; Suslow, Junghanns & Arolt, 2001).   
Attentional biases have also been implicated in suicidal behaviour (Williams 
& Broadbent, 1986; Becker, Strohbach & Rinck, 1999), but not hopelessness (Becker 
et al., 1999).  However, these findings are limited as the few existing studies used the 
emotional Stroop, a modified version of the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), to measure 
attentional bias (e.g. Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Becker et al., 1999).  The 
emotional Stroop requires participants to read aloud the colour of the ink that 
emotional words are printed in.  Participants are timed on this task and longer timings 
are thought to represent increased attentional bias.  There are, however, two main 
limitations of research using this method.  First, the emotional Stroop is unable to 
provide any information on the mechanisms of biases measured (e.g. whether 
interference in the colour naming of words results from attending to negative words, 
or cognitive efforts to suppress negative words – both situations would increase trial 
lengths) (de Ruiter & Brosschot, 1994).  Second, the emotional Stroop does not allow 
a direct comparison of patterns of attentional bias for different stimuli (e.g. larger 
Rumination, attentional biases and psychological distress 
 
5
5
attentional biases towards negative, in comparison to positive words may result from 
a bias to attend to negative words, or to suppress negative words).  A dot-probe 
measure (MacLeod et al., 1986) of attentional bias can overcome these weaknesses.  
Unlike the Stroop, the dot-probe task measures selective attention, two different types 
of stimuli are presented simultaneously (e.g. negative and positive words) and 
differing patterns of attention to these stimuli are calculated.  Therefore, a re-
examination of the relationship between both suicidal ideation and hopelessness and 
attentional bias, using a more robust measure of attentional bias, is required.   
Cognitive theory predicts that the interaction between stress and cognitive 
vulnerabilities results in future distress.  However, much attentional bias research 
examines the relationship between attentional bias and previous or current ratings of 
distress (Just, Abramson & Alloy, 2001), meaning that the predictions of cognitive 
theory cannot be directly tested.  One of the few studies to examine this potential 
interaction found that increased attentional bias towards negative stimuli, following a 
negative mood induction procedure, interacted with stress to predict dysphoria at a 
seven week follow up (Beevers & Carver, 2003).  Whether this relationship between 
attentional bias and stress is also predictive of other types of distress remains largely 
unexplored–and is one of the foci of the present study. 
 
Ruminative Response Style and Distress 
Similar to attentional bias, a ruminative response style is another cognitive 
vulnerability linked to distress (O’Connor, O’Connor & Marshall, in press).   A 
ruminative response style1 can be thought of as a series of thoughts and behaviours, 
occurring in response to a sad or negative mood, which result in an individual 
                                                 
1 The terms ruminative response style and rumination are used interchangeably in the literature, so we 
have adopted the same protocol here. 
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focusing on the causes and consequences of their emotions, leaving them unable to 
focus on distracting activities which may alleviate their symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1991).  As a consequence, this perseverative self-focus plays an important role in the 
maintenance of depression, whereby the process of focussing on depressive symptoms 
serves to enhance and prolong these symptoms.  Indeed, initial levels of rumination 
have been associated with the maintenance of depressive symptoms after one year 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, McBride & Larson, 1997).  A small number of studies have also 
examined the relationship between a ruminative response style and other types of 
distress.  Specifically, rumination has been cross-sectionally linked with hopelessness 
(Lam, Schuck, Smith, Farmer & Checkley, 2003) and suicide ideation (Eshun, 2000).  
In addition to maintaining distress, ruminative thinking has also been 
associated with a range of negative thinking styles.  Experimental research has shown 
that participants induced to ruminate were more likely to provide negative 
explanations for imaginary life events or interpersonal difficulties, than those in a 
distraction condition (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). In addition, 
participants induced to ruminate were gloomier about future positive events than 
those in a distraction condition (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995).  Further 
experimental work has illustrated that dysphoric participants undergoing a rumination 
induction recalled more negative autobiographical memories, both in free recall and 
following prompts, than dysphoric participants undergoing a distraction induction 
(Lyubomirsky, Caldwell & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998).   
 
Relationship between rumination and attentional bias 
A relationship between rumination and attentional bias has been suggested by some 
authors (e.g. Bradley et al., 1997; Mogg & Bradley, 2005).   Rumination is thought to 
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amplify the effects of negative mood on cognition (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2004).  As 
such, rumination can be seen as symptomatic of more general biases in information 
processing, such that the accessibility and salience of negative information is 
heightened (e.g. Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Lyubomirsky et al., 1998) 
and disengaging from negative information is difficult.  In addition, there is some 
evidence that ruminators have difficulty in accessing positive information (e.g. 
Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995).  These processes provide possible 
mechanisms to explain a relationship between rumination and attentional biases. 
However, a paucity of experimental research has examined the nature of the 
relationship between these two variables.  We are aware of only one study, Williams 
& Broadbent (1986), which reported a significant positive correlation between 
rumination and attentional bias for negative stimuli.  However, rumination was 
measured using one item where participants indicated “how ruminating they felt 
themselves to be (ruminating was defined as thoughts churning over and over in your 
mind)” (Williams & Broadbent, 1986 p.103) and attentional bias was measured using 
an emotional Stroop task.  It is, therefore, necessary to replicate this research using a 
psychometrically sound measure of rumination and a more robust measure of 
attentional bias.  In order to examine the possibility of causality between rumination 
and attentional bias, an experimental manipulation of rumination is required.  Nolen-
Hoeksema and Morrow (1993) have developed a rumination manipulation procedure 
which allowed for causation between rumination and attentional bias to be examined 
in the present research.   In addition, as the effects of rumination/distraction 
inductions appear to vary by mood (e.g. Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995), an 
experimental mood manipulation was also employed.   
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Aims 
In short, two limitations in the current literature were apparent:  First, much of the 
literature to date has failed to utilize a prospective study design to provide a more 
rigorous test of the diathesis-stress hypothesis.  Second, previous research examining 
the relationship between rumination and attentional bias has not used a 
psychometrically robust measure of rumination nor directly examined whether this 
relationship is causal. 
Consequently, this research had two main aims intended to address these 
limitations.  The first aim was to explore the nature of the relationship between 
rumination and attentional bias.  In this study we tested one possible relationship, that 
change in rumination would lead to change in attentional bias.  Specifically, we 
hypothesised that participants in the negative mood manipulation condition 
undergoing a rumination induction would increase in negative attentional bias and 
decrease in positive attentional bias from pre-to-post manipulations.  The second aim 
was to examine whether rumination or attentional bias (or both) could differentially 
predict distress (i.e., dysphoria, hopelessness and suicide ideation) prospectively 
within a diathesis-stress framework, after controlling for initial levels of distress.   
 
Method 
Participants 
Eighty-one healthy young adults were recruited from a Scottish University.  
Participants were student volunteers recruited via an online experiment management 
system and they were offered course credit in return for participation.  All participants 
were first informed that participation was voluntary and confidential and even after 
giving initial consent, they were free to withdraw at any stage.  Participants were aged 
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between 16 and 48 years with a mean age of 22.09 years (SD=6.25).  Fifty-eight 
females and 23 males participated in the study.  The majority of participants were not 
married (91.4%).        
The eighty-one participants who completed the initial self-report measures 
attended an experimental session between two and twenty days later with a median 
gap of four days (Time two).  Two different manipulations, each with two conditions, 
mood (negative or positive) and rumination (rumination or distraction), were 
employed at the experimental session.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
four experimental groups (termed negative rumination, positive rumination, negative 
distraction and positive distraction) covering each permutation of the aforementioned 
manipulations.  
 Seventy-three of the original participants went on to complete the final self-
report measures at time three, between fourteen and fifty-three days after the 
experimental session (median gap = 22 days), representing a 90.1% response rate at 
time three.  Participants not completing time three measures did not differ from those 
who did with regards to age or marital status.  However, proportionately more males 
(n=6) than females (n=2) did not complete time three measures (χ2 = 9.48 (1), p<.05), 
than those who did. 
 
Measures 
Rumination.  The Response Styles Questionnaire (Short Form) (Short RSQ: Davis & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000) provided a measure of participants’ ruminative tendencies in 
negative situations (e.g. ‘I think about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better’).  
This 10-item measure has been derived from the original Response Styles 
Questionnaire.  It is preferable to the original measure as it omits a number of items 
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which may reflect “automatic negative thoughts” (Nolen-Hoeksema, personal 
communication).  Participants were asked to rate each item on a 4-point scale 
according to the frequency with which they react in this manner when ‘sad, down or 
depressed’.  Higher scores reflect a greater ruminative response style in negative 
situations.  The scale has demonstrated significant test-retest reliability over one year 
(r = .47, p<.01) and construct validity (Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991).  Internal consistency in this sample was good (Cronbach’s α = .86). 
Hopelessness.  The Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck, Weissman, Lester & 
Trexler, 1974) measures pessimism towards the future (e.g. ‘It’s very unlikely that I 
will get any real satisfaction in the future’).  This 20-item scale asked participants to 
indicate their agreement or disagreement with each item.  Higher scores indicate 
greater levels of hopelessness.  Satisfactory internal consistency was achieved in this 
sample (α =.85 at both administrations).    
Dysphoria.  The Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; 
Radloff, 1977) provided a measure of dysphoria (e.g. ‘I felt that I was just as good as 
other people’).  This measured the frequency with which participants experienced 
depressive symptoms over the past week on a four point scale.  The CES-D has been 
established as an appropriate measure to use with a student population (Radloff, 
1989).  Higher scores on this measure are indicative of increased dysphoria.  Internal 
consistency in this sample was good across each time point (range of α = 92-.93). 
Suicidal Thinking.  The Suicide Probability Scale (SPS; Cull & Gill, 1988) provided 
an eight item measure of suicidal ideation (e.g. ‘In order to punish others, I think of 
suicide’).   Participants were asked to rate how frequently they experienced particular 
thoughts or feelings in the past week on a four point scale.  Higher scores on this 
measure suggest more suicidal ideation.  Internal consistency in this sample was good 
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(range α = .91 – .92).  This measure of suicidal ideation was selected because as well 
as being predictive of suicide risk (e.g. Larzelere, Smith, Batenhorst & Kelly, 1996; 
Witte, Fitzpatrick, Joiner, Bradley & Schmidt, 2005) it has demonstrated sensitivity to 
changes in suicidality (e.g. Rudd, Rajab, Orman, Stulman, Joiner & Dixon, 1996). 
Stress.  The Perceived Stress Scale (PSS; Cohen, Kamarck & Mermelstein, 1983) is a 
14-item measure of global stress (e.g. ‘How often have you felt nervous and 
stressed?’).  Participants indicate how they have been feeling over the past two weeks 
on a four point scale.  Higher scores indicate greater levels of perceived global stress.  
Internal consistency in this sample was satisfactory (Cronbach’s α = .86). 
Mood.  A ten centimetre visual analogue scale, anchored at sad and happy, provided a 
measure of participants’ mood.  An additional measure of mood was provided by the 
Profile of Mood States (POMS; McNair, Lorr and Droppleman, 1971).  The POMS 
required participants to rate a series of 65 adjectives on a five point scale in 
accordance with their current feelings.  Greater scores are indicative of increased 
mood disturbance.  Internal consistency was confirmed in this sample (range of α = 
.94 -.95) 
Attentional Bias.  A dot-probe task was used to provide a measure of attentional bias.  
The specifics of the dot-probe task used here reflect those of Beevers and Carver 
(2003).  Thus, two words, 3cm apart were presented on the centre of a computer 
screen simultaneously for 750msecs.  After a 200msec pause a probe appeared on the 
screen in the same location as one of the previous words.  Participants pressed one of 
two keys on the keyboard, as quickly as possible, to indicate the location of the probe.  
The entire task took approximately four minutes to complete.  Reaction times were 
recorded and faster reaction times were thought to indicate that the participant was 
attending to the word in the same spatial location as the probe.   
Rumination, attentional biases and psychological distress 
 
12
12
Following Beevers and Carver (2003), 32 word pairs were presented for each 
participant.  Each pairing was randomly assigned one negative and one positive word; 
the pairs were then displayed in a random sequence.  The valence of the word 
preceding the probe was counterbalanced across trials.  Baseline reaction time was 
measured at the start of the task by eight trials where participants were presented with 
pairs of ‘XXXXX’s rather than words.  Participants then completed 16 practice trials 
with neutral word pairs before starting the experimental phase of the task, using 
valenced words.   
 Again, following Beevers and Carver (2003), the words used in this task were 
selected from a standardized list created by John (1988) ensuring the positive and 
negative words used were comparable in terms of length, frequency of usage and 
“emotionality”.  The stimuli and procedure remained the same for the second 
administration of the task; however, the randomized nature of presentation meant the 
order in which word pairings occurred varied. 
Rumination and Distraction Manipulations.  Both the rumination and distraction 
manipulations were based on procedures developed by Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow 
(1993), adapted by Lavender and Watkins (2004) for use with British participants.  
Participants were asked to visualize, focus and concentrate on a series of 45-items in 
an eight minute self-paced task.  In the rumination condition, these items related to 
either symptoms, emotions, or the self (e.g. ‘Think about: the physical sensations you 
feel in your body’).  In the distraction condition each item was focused externally 
away from the self and was unconnected to feelings or symptoms (e.g. ‘Think about: 
raindrops sliding down a window pane’).  
Positive and Negative Mood Manipulations.  The mood induction task followed 
Moore and Oaksford’s (2002) procedure where an adaptation of the Velten mood 
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induction procedure (Velten, 1968) was combined with music and a specific request 
to participants to try to alter their mood state.   In the positive condition, music 
consisted of Mozart’s Einekleine Nachtmusik, alongside statements including ‘I have 
complete confidence in myself’.  In the negative condition statements such as ‘Just 
when I think things are going to get better, something else goes wrong’ were 
accompanied by Barber’s Adagio for Strings.   
Procedure 
Prior to the collection of any data, ethical approval was obtained from the University 
Psychology Department’s ethics committee.  At time one (T1), participants were 
asked to complete self-report measures of rumination, dysphoria, hopelessness and 
suicidal thinking.  All participants then attended a lab-based session approximately 
four days later (T2).  At this lab-based session participants completed a dot-probe 
task, to provide a baseline measure of attentional bias.  Participants were randomly 
allocated to one of four manipulation groups and these groups were not matched on 
any of the baseline measures.  Participants then rated their current mood before 
completing the appropriate manipulation procedures.  The order of the manipulation 
procedures was counter-balanced.   Following the manipulations, participants re-rated 
their mood and completed an additional dot-probe task.  At the final time point (T3; 
approximately 3 weeks later), participants were asked to re-complete self report 
measures of dysphoria, hopelessness, suicidal thinking and stress.    
Results 
Effect of manipulations on mood 
In order to examine the effect of the manipulations on mood, repeated measures 
ANOVAs were conducted to examine differences in both the Profile of Mood States 
(POMS) and visual analogue scores, pre-and post-inductions, between groups.    No 
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significant differences on POMS scores were present prior to manipulations.  Analysis 
of the POMS total mood disturbance scores pre-and post-manipulations showed a 
significant manipulation group x time interaction (F (3, 77) = 15.84, p<.001) (see 
Table 1).  Further exploration of this interaction using paired t-tests illustrated that the 
negative rumination group significantly increased in mood disturbance (t (20) = -2.93, 
p<.01) from pre-to post-manipulations.  In contrast, the positive rumination (t (19) = 
3.37, p<.001) and the positive distraction (t (19) = 6.78, p<.001) groups decreased in 
mood disturbance from pre-to post-manipulations.  No change in mood disturbance 
was observed in the negative distraction group from pre to post manipulations.   
Analysis of the visual analogue scales pre-and post-manipulations showed a 
significant manipulation group x time interaction (F (3, 77) = 52.24, p<.001) (see 
Table 1).  Further exploration of this interaction using paired t-tests illustrated that the 
negative rumination (t (20) = 7.75, p<.001) and negative distraction (t (19) = 8.99, 
p<.001) groups significantly decreased in visual analogue scale (VAS) scores from 
pre-to post-manipulations.  In contrast, the positive distraction group (t (19) = -6.07, 
p< .001) significantly increased in VAS scores from pre-to post-manipulations.  
Although there was an increase in VAS scores from pre-to post-manipulations for the 
positive rumination group, this failed to reach significance (t (19) = -.1.99, n.s).   
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
Change in attentional bias 
Prior to calculating change in attentional bias, consistent with other studies in the field 
(e.g. Beevers & Carver, 2003; Bradley et al, 1997), all incorrect responses along with 
very fast (less than 200msecs) and very slow (more than 2000msecs) responses were 
identified and excluded from all subsequent analyses.  This excluded data accounted 
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for 1.89% of total responses, comparable to other research in this area (e.g. Beevers & 
Carver, 2003).    
 In order to calculate change in attentional bias from pre to post induction a 
standardized change score (Judd & Kenny, 1981) was computed.  Unlike raw change 
scores, standardized change scores have the advantage of controlling for differences 
in variance in pre-to-post manipulation scores (Campbell & Kenny, 1999).   
Following Beevers & Carver (2003), change in reaction time was calculated 
separately for negative, positive and baseline stimuli using the following equation: 
 
Change in Dot-probe = Mean Score Dot-Probe T2 – (Mean Score Dot-probe T1  
  x SD T2 Dot-probe / SD T1 Dot-probe)   
 
As the standardized change scores were mean centred, positive scores represent 
increased reaction time, meaning decreased attentional bias.  Whereas, negative 
scores reflect a decrease in reaction time and therefore increased attentional bias.    
 
Correlations between variables 
As can be seen from Table 2, rumination was significantly positively correlated with 
each measure of distress at T1 and T3, as well as stress (range of r = .47 - .78).  
However, rumination was not significantly correlated with either change in positive or 
negative attentional bias2.  Change in positive or negative attentional bias was not 
correlated with any measures of distress at T1 or T3, nor did they significantly 
correlate with group or each other.  Stress was significantly positively correlated with 
                                                 
2 Correlations between rumination and positive and negative attentional bias were also examined 
separately for each group and for positive and negative mood manipulation groups, but no significant 
correlations were observed.  
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each measure of distress, at T1 and T3, in addition to rumination (range of r = .43-
.87). 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
 
 
Change in attentional bias pre-to post-manipulations 
To investigate change in attentional bias from pre to post manipulations, between 
groups analysis of variance was conducted, using change in response to baseline 
stimuli as a covariate, to control for differences in baseline reaction time3.  With 
regards to negative attentional bias, the negative rumination group (M = -92.25, SD = 
431.46) show an increase from pre-to-post induction, whilst the negative distraction 
(M = 30.272, SD = 206.566), positive rumination (M = 17.662, SD = 287.182) and 
positive distraction (M = 48.925, SD = 330.303) groups all decreased.  However, due 
to the large standard deviations, there were no significant differences between groups 
(F (3, 76) = .84, n.s.).   
With respect to positive attentional bias, the negative distraction group (M = -147.47, 
SD = 407.51) showed an increase from pre-to-post inductions, whilst the negative 
rumination (M = 84.20, SD = 175.14), positive rumination (M = 26.246, SD = 
228.360) and positive distraction (M = 32.811, SD = 149.187) groups all decreased.  
There was a significant main effect of manipulation group on change in attentional 
bias for positive stimuli (F (3, 76) = 3.11, p<.05).  Further analyses examining 
differences between specific manipulation groups revealed only the negative 
rumination and negative distraction groups significantly differed from each other on 
change in positive attentional bias (F (1, 38) = 5.55, p<.05).  Thus modifying 
                                                 
3 The analyses were conducted to examine the effects of mood manipulation and rumination 
manipulations independently, however no significant effects were observed.  For the sake of brevity 
only the analyses examining the effect of the mood and rumination manipulations combined are 
presented here.   
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rumination and mood had differential effects on attentional bias towards positive 
stimuli.  Participants in the negative rumination group showed increased reaction 
time, therefore decreased attentional bias, towards positive stimuli from pre to post 
manipulations.  In contrast, participants in the negative distraction group decreased in 
reaction time, therefore increasing in attentional bias, toward positive stimuli from pre 
to post manipulations.   
Cognitive vulnerabilities as predictors of distress at T3 
In order to examine both attentional biases and rumination as cognitive 
vulnerabilities associated with distress at T3, a series of regression analyses were 
performed.  Analyses were conducted separately for each type of distress (i.e., 
dysphoria, hopelessness and suicidal ideation).  In each analysis, the appropriate 
measure of distress at time 3 (T3) was entered as the dependant variable.  The 
corresponding measure of distress at time 1 (T1) was entered as the first step in the 
regression, along with change in baseline reaction time (to control for individual 
differences in reaction time) and manipulation group (to control for differences in 
attentional biases between groups).  The second step of the regression analyses 
contained the main effects of rumination at T1, change in negative and positive 
attentional bias and perceived stress at T3.  The third step contained the appropriate 
multiplicative terms for each of these main effects.  The final step of each analysis 
contained the appropriate three-way interactions between each of the main effects.   
Any significant interaction terms were examined by plotting the regression 
lines of best fit at high (one standard deviation above the mean) and low (one standard 
deviation below the mean) levels of the appropriate interaction terms, as prescribed by 
Aiken and West (1991).  Where appropriate, the regression lines of best fit were then 
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probed post hoc to examine whether the slopes were significantly different from zero, 
again consonant with Aiken and West (1991).   
Rumination, attentional biases and stress as predictors of distress at T3 
Table 3 illustrates the results of the regression analyses predicting distress at T3.    
Mean hopelessness scores were 3.89 (SD=3.73) at T1 and 3.60 (SD=3.67) at T3.  
When predicting hopelessness at T3, initial levels of hopelessness (β= .59, t (58) = 
7.27, p<.001), perceived stress at T3 (β= .18, t (58) = 2.03, p<.05) and the interaction 
between rumination and stress (β= .19, t (58) = 2.54, p<.05) were significant 
predictors in the final step of the analysis.  A plot of the lines of best fit for the 
interaction between rumination and stress can been seen in Figure 1.  Post-hoc 
probing of the analysis revealed that the high slope significantly differed from zero 
(β= .24, t (58) = 2.03, p<.05), but the low slope just failed to reach significance (β= -
.18, t (58) = -.1.70, p = .094).  Thus, high perceived stress, in combination with higher 
initial levels of rumination, was predictive of greater hopelessness at T3.   
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 Mean dysphoria scores were 15.28 (SD=12.28) at T1 and 12.04 (SD=10.21) at 
T3.  When predicting dysphoria at T3, perceived stress (β= .76, t (58) = 10.50, 
p<.001) and the interaction between rumination and stress (β= .22, t (58) = 3.69, 
p<.001) were significant predictors in the final step of the analysis.  In addition, 
rumination (β= .17, t (58) = 1.87, p = .066) and the interaction between negative 
attentional bias, rumination and stress (β= -.13, t (58) = -1.81, p = .075) also showed a 
trend towards significance to predict dysphoria.  Post-hoc probing of this interaction 
revealed that the high (β= .39, t (58) = 3.42, p<.001) but not the low slope 
significantly differed from zero (β= -.06, t (58) = -.57, N.S).  This demonstrates that 
high perceived stress in combination with high rumination was predictive of increased 
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dysphoria.  As illustrated in Figure 2, the trend towards significance for the 3-way 
interaction between negative attentional bias, rumination and stress suggests that high 
stress overall was predictive of greater dysphoria.  Within this general pattern 
however, high stress combined with increased negative attentional bias and high 
rumination was predictive of higher dysphoria, whilst increased negative attentional 
bias, combined with low rumination was predictive of lower dysphoria.   
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 Mean suicidal thinking scores were 9.99 (SD=3.70) at T1 and 9.14 (SD=2.71) 
at T3. When predicting suicidal thinking at T3, only initial levels of suicidal thinking 
(β= .56, t (58) = 4.47, p<.001) and the interaction between rumination and stress (β= 
.26, t (58) = 2.93, p<.01) were significant predictors in the final step of the analysis.  
A plot of the lines of best fit for the interaction between rumination and stress can be 
seen in Figure 3.  Post-hoc probing of this interaction found that the low (β= -.24, t 
(58) = -2.10, p<.05), but not the high slope (β= .27, t (58) = 1.65, p= .104) 
significantly differed from zero.  This suggests that low perceived stress combined 
with high rumination was predictive of lower levels of suicidal thinking.  
[Insert Figure 3 and Table 3 about here] 
 
Discussion 
The first aim of this research was to explore the relationship between rumination and 
attentional bias.  The results indicated there was no significant correlation between 
rumination and either positive or negative attentional bias.  However, the results also 
illustrated that manipulating rumination between groups had differential effects on 
positive attentional bias, suggesting a causal relationship between rumination and 
positive attentional bias.   
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The second aim of this research was to examine whether rumination or 
attentional bias (or both) could prospectively predict levels of distress within a 
diathesis-stress framework, after controlling for initial levels of distress.  The results 
indicated that rumination interacted with stress to prospectively predict hopelessness, 
dysphoria and suicidal thinking.  In addition, the interaction between negative 
attentional bias, rumination and stress showed a trend towards significance to predict 
dysphoria.  Positive attentional bias was not found to significantly predict any 
measure of distress.   
 The finding that manipulating levels of rumination altered positive attentional 
bias shows, for the first time, a causal relationship between rumination and positive 
attentional bias.  As hypothesised, for those participants completing a negative mood 
manipulation procedure, inducing rumination was associated with decreased positive 
attentional bias, whilst inducing distraction was associated with an increase in positive 
attentional bias.  The same pattern was not observed for those participants completing 
a positive mood manipulation procedure, lending support to Nolen-Hoeksema’s 
(1991) response styles theory which views rumination as a response to negative 
mood. We had also hypothesised that for those participants completing a negative 
mood manipulation procedure, inducing rumination would increase negative 
attentional bias and inducing distraction would decrease negative attentional bias.  
Although our data are consistent with this pattern, the results did reach conventional 
levels for statistical significance. These findings suggest that rumination in 
combination with negative mood, results in a decreasing tendency to focus on positive 
stimuli, although not necessarily a corresponding increase in attending to negative 
stimuli.  Again, this fits with response styles theory which envisages rumination as a 
persistent focus on the causes and consequences of emotions, rendering the individual 
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less able to focus on other distracting (positive) activities.  More research in this area 
is necessary to identify the specific mechanism which links rumination to positive 
attentional bias.   
Rumination was found to interact with stress to prospectively predict a 
number of measures of psychological distress, such that under high stress, increased 
rumination was predictive of greater dysphoria and hopelessness.  In addition, under 
low levels of stress, increased rumination was predictive of lower levels of suicidal 
thinking.  This extended work by Morrison and O’Connor (2005) where, in a healthy 
population, rumination interacted with stress to predict social dysfunction, suggesting 
that this interaction is also observed with other measures of distress.  These 
prospective findings also extend previous cross-sectional research linking rumination 
with hopelessness (Lam et al, 2003) and suicidal ideation (Eshun, 2000).  
Recent work has proposed rumination in response to a specific stressor may 
have a role in the development of distress (Robinson & Alloy, 2003).  This ‘stress-
reactive rumination’ reflects a “tendency to ruminate on negative inferences following 
stressful life events” (Robinson & Alloy, 2003 p. 276).  The current findings provide 
some support for Robinson and Alloy’s (2003) notion of ‘stress-reactive rumination’, 
as the impact of rumination on distress was moderated by levels of stress.  However, 
it must be noted that the current study used a measure of global stress and more 
research is necessary to determine whether the same findings would result from 
measures of stress in response to specific life events.  Nonetheless, the current 
research indicates that there may be a need for response styles theory to incorporate 
the role of stress as, in this research, rumination did not always have a detrimental 
effect on levels of distress.   
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The trend towards significance for the interaction between negative attentional 
bias, rumination and stress suggested that increased negative attentional bias 
(following manipulations), in combination with high stress and high rumination was 
predictive of higher dysphoria.  In contrast, increased negative attentional bias 
(following manipulations) in combination with low stress and high rumination was 
predictive of lower dysphoria.  Previous research found that change in negative 
attentional bias interacted with life stress to predict dysphoria over seven weeks 
(Beevers & Carver, 2003).  The results for the present study suggest that rumination 
levels also impact on this interaction between negative attentional bias and stress, as 
in the present study, the pattern of results observed by Beevers and Carver were only 
seen in combination with high rumination. The failure to find a relationship between 
negative attentional bias and hopelessness or suicidal thinking, is consistent with 
previous research employing an emotional Stroop measure of attentional bias 
(Williams and Broadbent, 1986; Becker et al, 1999).   
In the present research, positive attentional bias was not independently related 
to distress.  Although previous work indicated that the absence of positive attentional 
biases may be associated with clinical depression (McCabe & Gotlib, 1995; Suslow, 
Junghanns & Arolt, 2001), we were unable to replicate this finding in a non-clinical 
sample.   Similar to the present results, Becker and colleagues (1999) previously 
failed to find a relationship between positive attentional biases and hopelessness or 
previous suicidal behaviour, using an emotional Stroop measure of attentional bias.       
The current study had two main limitations: First, the focus of this research 
was specifically on university students, meaning the results may not be applicable to a 
clinical population.  However, the high levels of distress reported by university 
students in recent years (Furr, Westefeld, McConnell & Jenkins, 2001) suggests a 
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need for research specifically focusing on this population in order to examine the 
relationship between distress and potentially modifiable cognitive variables, to 
facilitate the development of methods for intervention.  Second, the reliance on self-
report measures may be cited as a potential limitation of this research.  However, 
given that interactions emerged from the data, it seems unlikely that social desirability 
effects confounded the results.   
Despite the limitations noted above, this research has a number of implications.  First, 
this research has, for the first time, examined the relationship between attentional bias 
and a reliable and valid measure of rumination.  The findings confirm previous 
speculation of a relationship between the two and suggest a causal role for rumination 
in positive attentional bias.  Second, the research provided evidence of interactions 
between rumination and stress to predict a number of measures of distress.  This 
provides support for the suggestion that response styles theory should be extended to 
include the role of stress and points to a possible role for stress-reactive rumination.  
Third, the research suggested that negative attentional biases, in combination with 
rumination and stress may play a role in predicting dysphoria. Increased negative 
attentional bias, following manipulations, combined with high rumination and high 
perceived stress, was predictive of the highest levels of dysphoria.  This expands 
previous research in the area and provides further evidence for links between 
rumination and attentional bias.   
 The research also raises clinical implications.  Increased dysphoria, 
hopelessness and suicidal thinking in university students were predicted by 
rumination in combination with higher levels of stress.  Additionally, increased 
dysphoria was also predicted by increased negative attentional bias in conjunction 
with higher rumination and higher perceived stress levels.  As stress is an often 
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unavoidable consequence of academic study, clinical interventions may do better to 
focus on the potentially modifiable cognitive variables of rumination and attentional 
bias.    
Despite the use of a healthy sample in this research, it is possible to tentatively 
speculate about the implications of our findings for clinically depressed individuals.  
The role of cognitive biases in depression has been well established therefore 
modifying such biases could form the basis of a cognitive behavioural therapy 
treatment approach.  The findings of our research indicate that the experience of 
rumination in combination with higher levels of stress was predictive of increased 
dysphoria, hopelessness and suicidal thinking.  This suggests that treatment protocols 
which focus on reducing ruminative thinking may be beneficial for depressed 
individuals.  Indeed, the results from a recent case series showed that ruminative 
thinking could be reduced over the course of up to twelve treatment sessions based on 
cognitive-behavioural methods (Watkins et al., in press). 
To conclude, by focusing on a number of measures of distress, this research 
has advanced knowledge into the predictors of psychological distress.   This research 
has also increased our theoretical knowledge about rumination and attentional bias 
and how they relate to each other and to different measures of distress.    
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 Table 1.  Mood scores and standard deviations from pre-to-post manipulations by 
group 
 
Measure Manipulation Group Pre Manipulation Mean (SD) Post Manipulation Mean (SD) 
Negative Rumination 38.90    (38.70) 60.14    (32.70) 
Negative Distraction 33.80    (35.03) 36.15    (33.53) 
Positive Rumination 27.50    (34.00) 8.40      (20.12) 
POMS total mood 
disturbance  
Positive Distraction 30.25    (33.07) 2.05      (24.91) 
Negative Rumination 75.52    (12.40) 54.38    (12.93) 
Negative Distraction 73.40    (15.78) 55.75    (17.99) 
Positive Rumination 79.20    (12.25) 83.45    (9.28) 
Visual Analogue 
Scale 
Positive Distraction 69.65    (11.97) 80.70    (14.18) 
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Table 2. Correlations between rumination, negative attentional bias, positive 
attentional bias, stress and distress variables at time one (T1) and time three (T3). 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1.   Rumination  T1 -         
2.   Hopelessness T1 .492** -        
3.   Dysphoria T1 .781** .552** -       
4.   Suicidal Thinking T1 .716** .551** .736** -      
5.   Hopelessness T3 .466** .792** .573** .559** -     
6.   Dysphoria T3      .598** .528** .647** .611** .693** -    
7.   Suicidal Thinking T3 .554** .499** .534** .812** .569** .635** -   
8.   Stress T3 .519** .434** .583** .478** .564** .868** .498** -  
9. ∆ Positive Attentional Bias -.049 -.058 -.064 -.090 -.040 -.077 -.087 -.018 - 
10. ∆ Negative Attentional Bias .133 -.074 .099 .133 -.082 .089 .139 .110 -.099 
** p<.01 
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 Table 3.  Hierarchical multiple regression analyses to examine attentional biases, 
rumination and stress as predictors of distress at T3 
 Predictor Variable R Adj. R2 ∆ R2 F(3,72) 
Dependent Variable:  Hopelessness T3 
Step 1: Hopelessness T1 
∆ Baseline Reaction Time 
Manipulation Group 
.797 .635  40.089*** 
Step 2: ∆ Negative Attentional Bias 
∆ Positive Attentional Bias 
Rumination T1 
Stress T3 
.836 .698 .063 3.396* 
Step 3: ∆ Negative Attentional Bias x Stress T3 
∆ Positive Attentional Bias x Stress T3 
Rumination T1 x Stress T3 
∆ Negative Attentional Bias x Rumination T1 
∆ Positive Attentional Bias x Rumination T1 
.872 .760 .062 3.069* 
Step 4: ∆ Negative Attentional Bias x Rumination T1 x Stress T3 
∆ Positive Attentional Bias x Rumination T1 x Stress T3 
 
.876 .768 .008 .994 
Dependent Variable:  Dysphoria T3 
 
Step 1: Dysphoria T1 
∆ Baseline Reaction Time 
Manipulation Group 
.658 .433  17.589*** 
Step 2: ∆ Negative Attentional Bias 
∆ Positive Attentional Bias 
Rumination T1 
Stress T3 
.892 .796 .363 28.839*** 
Step 3: ∆ Negative Attentional Bias x Stress T3 
∆ Positive Attentional Bias x Stress T3 
Rumination T1 x Stress T3 
∆ Negative Attentional Bias x Rumination T1 
∆ Positive Attentional Bias x Rumination T1 
.912 .832 .036 2.618* 
Step 4: ∆ Negative Attentional Bias x Rumination T1 x Stress T3 
∆ Positive Attentional Bias x Rumination T1 x Stress T3 
 
.919 .844 .012 2.260 
Dependent Variable:  Suicidal Thinking T3 
 
Step 1: Suicidal Thinking T1 
∆ Baseline Reaction Time 
Manipulation Group 
.820 .672  47.063*** 
Step 2: ∆ Negative Attentional Bias 
∆ Positive Attentional Bias 
Rumination T1 
Stress T3 
.836 .699 .027 1.445 
Step 3: ∆ Negative Attentional Bias x Stress T3 
∆ Positive Attentional Bias x Stress T3 
Rumination T1 x Stress T3 
∆ Negative Attentional Bias x Rumination T1 
∆ Positive Attentional Bias x Rumination T1 
.863 .745 .046 2.198 
Step 4: ∆ Negative Attentional Bias x Rumination T1 x Stress T3 
∆ Positive Attentional Bias x Rumination T1 x Stress T3 
.864 .747 .002 .194 
* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Figure 1.  Interaction of high and low levels of rumination and high and low levels of 
stress to predict hopelessness at time three. 
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Figure 2.  Interaction between high and low levels of negative attentional bias, high 
and low levels of rumination and high (Panel B) and low levels (Panel A) of stress to 
predict dysphoria at time three.  
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Figure 3.  Interaction of high and low levels of rumination and high and low levels of 
stress to predict suicidal thinking at time three. 
 
 
